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Les voies du salut (The Ways of Salvation) is moreau’s second book-long 
contribution to philosophy of religion, following Foi en Dieu et raison. 
Théodicées (Faith in God and reason. Theodicies). While Foi en Dieu dealt 
with restricted elements of religious belief and was intended for a popular 
audience, Les Voies du Salut turns to a more ambitious agenda, arguing at 
a professional level the philosophical justifiability of the core Christian 
doctrine: Jesus’ victory over Death. Happily, those higher standards 
changed none of moreau’s writing characteristics: a good-natured tone 
which makes the reading always pleasant, a constant commitment to 
argumentative clarity and, more substantially, an intention to prove 
the possibility of a rational treatment of religious belief. In the French 
context, those characteristics are exceptional enough to make this 
publication a most welcome event, one likely to foster dispassionate 
discussions between philosophers of various backgrounds.
The book as a whole takes the form of a pragmatic argument addressed 
to non-believers for the conclusion that the Christian faith is justified. 
Here is the reasoning in rough outline.
In part I (“on belief ”), moreau, drawing mainly on William James, 
defends the legitimacy of pragmatic reasons to believe about matters 
that lay beyond truth-directed evidence and when what we choose to 
believe has huge consequences. Part II (“on Death”) argues that the 
issue of what happens after death is precisely of this sort, and that it 
is therefore legitimate to enquire into the expected benefits and losses 
associated with the various options. moreau, discussing Heidegger, 
argues that the default or natural belief on that matter is that death is the 
end of life, “the possibility of the absolute impossibility”, and that this 
is a bad thing for us. moreau doesn’t really try to answer philosophical 
arguments to the effect that death isn’t a bad thing, for what matters for 
his purposes is the actual causal effects of the belief; and moreau brings 
forth substantial evidence that, for all philosophical arguments can do, it 
is an ineliminable anthropological constant that death as the end of life 
produces a reaction of fear. Part III (“on Faults”) further enquires into 
the causal consequences of our natural belief about death. The core idea, 
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borrowed from lucretius, is that the fear of death is somehow responsible 
for all the evil actions we perform. moreau tries to substantiate this 
intuition by showing how various faults (greed, gluttony, lust, pride, etc.) 
could psychologically derive from the fear of death.
In these preliminary parts, moreau does not pretend to have advanced 
many new ideas. What is new, though, is to bring them together and 
confront us with the following situation: the natural belief about death is 
one that should be accepted or rejected on pragmatic reasons according 
to its consequences, and on the face of it, its consequences are terrible. 
Indeed, this belief is arguably the real cause of all humanity’s problems. 
That’s why part IV (“on liberation”) sets out on a quest for a better belief 
about death – one that entails that there will be a life after death, that 
this life will really be my individual life, and will also be (most probably) 
happy. moreau finally argues that the Christian creed – that Jesus has 
vanquished Death by rising from the dead – satisfies all those criteria 
and is therefore very likely to set us free from the fear of death, the source 
of all evils. Thus, we have good pragmatic reasons to accept that Jesus is 
risen.
In a concluding part, moreau confronts his general theory with those of 
other philosophers (epicurus, Heidegger, Nietzsche). The confrontation 
with Pascal’s wager is probably the most relevant to understand an 
original feature of moreau’s pragmatic approach. Pascal wagers this life 
(worldly pleasures) for benefits expected in the after life (heaven). but 
the benefits that motivate moreau’s “wager” (the end of one’s evil actions) 
are all in this life itself – “in Immanence” – quite independent of whether 
or not the kingdom eventually “will be added unto you”.
before I come to an evaluation of the main argument, I should warn 
the reader about two ways in which this reconstruction may misrepresent 
moreau’s work.
First, moreau’s book is similar to Descartes’ Meditations in that it 
proposes for the reader a progressive path of considerations to be assumed 
in the first person singular. reading the argument in an impersonal 
attitude (‘death is feared’ instead of ‘I fear death’), or reaching conclusions 
before following every step of the meditation, is contrary to moreau’s 
demands. This is a request a review could hardly comply with, I’m afraid.
Second, though the main argument is apologetic in nature and 
mainly addressed to non-believers, the book is also of crucial interest to 
Christian philosophers of religion, for it hinges on an original analysis 
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of the notion of Salvation. Indeed, I think moreau’s project is best 
understood as the elaboration of a Core Intuition:
(CI) The Christian Faith somehow suppresses the fear of death, 
thereby suppressing some important incentive to sin.
into a Theological Hypothesis:
(TH) The causal process described in (CI) might just be what 
Christian Theology calls Salvation.
and finally into a hypothesis about the epistemology of Faith:
(eF) The desirable causal effects described in (CI) might constitute 
the pragmatic reason that justifies us in accepting the Christian creed.
(eF) is of course what gives the basis for the apologetic argument 
presented above. but a Christian philosopher of religion may still find 
in moreau’s book a lot to agree with even if he isn’t convinced by (eF) 
and by the corresponding apologetic project. That’s why I shall comment 
on the Core Intuition and the Theological Hypothesis before I turn to 
an appraisal of the apologetic argument itself.
The Core Intuition is thought-provoking and it is definitely an 
important asset of moreau’s book to bring attention to an effect of faith 
that is often neglected despite its presence in traditional writings, e.g. in 
Aquinas’s commentary on Hebrews, 2, 15:
“If a man overcomes this fear [of death], he overcomes all fears; and 
when fear is overcome, all disordered love of the world is overcome. Thus 
Christ by His death broke this bondage, because He removed the fear of 
death.” (Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, transl. by Fabian r. 
larcher, o.P., e-text accessed at url = <http://dhspriory.org/thomas/
SSHebrews.htm>, 4/10/2011; revised by myself).
moreau thereby makes room for very interesting discussions about the 
details of this intuition: Does faith suppress the psychological passion 
of fear or only its sin-inducing power? Does the removal happen 
instantaneously when accepting faith or progressively? Is such a process 
accorded to some Christians as one among other ways to prevent sins, 
or is it an essential feature in every Christian’s Salvation? moreau’s quite 
defensible view on all this is that, though the removal is a long-term 
process, one never fully accomplished in this life, the fear itself tends towards 
removal in every Christian’s life as an essential way of Salvation. moreau 
notes that this model could in principle be combined with a satisfaction 
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model, in order to generate an overall theory of Salvation, as Aquinas 
arguably does, but he also tentatively advances the hypothesis that this 
sin-removing process by itself might just be what we call ‘Salvation’.
This new and challenging Theological Hypothesis is compared by 
moreau to three other Theories of Salvation: Satisfaction, liberation and 
Deification. The theory is best presented in reference to three questions 
that any theory of Salvation should answer: from what, by what, and how 
are we saved? I briefly discuss moreau’s answers.
From our proneness to sin. obviously, God saves us from humanity’s 
big predicament. but what is this predicament? moreau accepts the 
lucretian answer to this question: our big problem is that we spoil our lives 
by our sins, as a consequence of our fear of death. remove our proneness 
to sin and all will be fine. moreau is silent on another predicament of 
humanity: alienation from God. Solving this predicament is just what 
traditional theology calls reconciliation / atonement / expiation (all 
translations of the Hebrew ‘kippur’). I suppose what moreau implicitly 
suggests is a transparent theory of atonement: nothing needs to be done 
for reconciliation proper; as soon as our proneness to perform new sins 
is cured, God in His mercy will automatically, as it were, also forgive us 
any past sins. moreau’s eschewing any properly atoning part in Christ’s 
action seems to be apologetically motivated by the consideration that 
the very notions of expiation and sacrifice “have become somehow 
unintelligible for a large part of the contemporary audience” (p. 209). 
but this move also faces difficulties: since the fear-removal will never 
be fully accomplished, we will never be able to offer God the expiation 
of a sinless heart. Some other heart than ours seems needed for that. 
Furthermore, there is powerful scriptural evidence (e.g. the Epistle to the 
Hebrews) that some properly reconciliatory action, whether necessary or 
not, was actually performed by Christ.
By the belief that Jesus is risen. The focus on resurrection is also 
apologetically motivated by the contemporary reluctance to give Jesus’ 
Passion any intrinsic role. Furthermore, the focus on the power of belief 
gives a strong meaning to ‘Salvation by Faith’. maybe too strong though, 
if we notice that the sin-removing role is played here by the belief-that (or 
‘unformed faith’), while no crucial role is acknowledged for the belief-in, 
or personal relationship with Jesus. Those considerations might explain 
why the eucharist, as a commemoration of the amount of love displayed 
by Christ in His Passion, and as a way to allow a loving union with Him, 
doesn’t find its place in moreau’s picture of sin-removal.
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Through psychological causation. Another apologetic motivation 
for moreau’s model is its relying on no other mechanism than natural 
causation. A drawback is that it is famously difficult to conceive of 
backward causation. This obviously raises a problem for people living 
before Christ. For sure, many theories leave it unclear how exactly those 
people could be saved by Christ, but moreau’s theory makes it clear that 
they couldn’t.
For all those reasons, I do not think that the Core Intuition, 
though persuasive as a model of something involved in Salvation, can 
convincingly be extended into a self-sufficient Theory of what Salvation 
is. It is not completely clear whether this threatens moreau’s original 
understanding of his model, but it does undermine the aforementioned 
apologetic motivations to restrict ourselves to it.
Can the Core Intuition be used to devise an Apologetic Argument? 
That is: can we be justified in accepting that Jesus is risen for the expected 
benefit of getting rid of the fear of death, and of the sins this fear produces?
my main worry about a non truth-directed strategy against the fear of 
death was best expressed by C.S. lewis:
In religion, as in war and everything else, comfort is the one thing you 
cannot get by looking for it. If you look for truth, you may find comfort 
in the end: if you look for comfort you will not get either comfort or 
truth (Mere Christianity, San Francisco: Harper, 2001, p. 32).
In particular, if our reason to believe in a life after death consists in our 
intention to avoid future sins, then a man at the point of death apparently 
has very little reason to accept this belief. So it seems that this strategy 
gives the smallest comfort against death when we would need it most.
Furthermore, if I were really comparing the various belief options as 
alternative “anti-sin pills”, I’d want to check empirically what efficiency 
they have had in suppressing sins, instead of relying on psychological 
speculations such as those given in part III. This should lead moreau 
to the more traditional – and famously tricky – issue of the moral 
superiority of Christians. but moreau himself, in the only sentence in 
which he considers what experience shows in that matter, expresses great 
scepticism (cf. p. 307).
To conclude: though I remain sceptical about its apologetic aspect and 
its capacity to constitute a self-standing Theory of Salvation, moreau’s 
book brings original and penetrating insights into one way God can cure 
our proneness to sin.
